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Exporting United States Drug Law: An 
Example of the International Legal 
Ramifications of the W a r  On Drugs" 
Any doubt regarding the Bush Admigistration's commit- 
ment to its highly publicized 'War on Drugs" disappeared on 
the night of December 19,1989, as more than 20,000 American 
soldiers swarmed across Panama. The massive military effort 
was justified by a federal grand jury indictment against alleged 
drug trafficker and fugitive Panamanian strongman Manuel 
~oriega.' The invasion, then the biggest U.S. military opera- 
tion since Vietnam; raised a worldwide chorus of condemna- 
tion. Yet the Panamanian occupation is merely the latest drug- 
related step in a trend that dates back decades. One commen- 
tator has suggested that our countrg's three largest exports are 
now "rock music, blue jeans, and United States law." The ex- 
traterritorial enforcement of United States law has led to a 
plethora of practical and theoretical problems: not the least of 
1. See George J. Church, Showing Muscle With the Invasion of Panama, a Bold- 
er-and Riskier-Bush Foreign Policy Emerges, TIME, January 1, 1990, at 20. While 
there were certainly other considerations that led President Bush to take this ac- 
tion, one of the principle justifications voiced by the Administration was Noriega's 
alleged involvement with Colombian drug lords and his outstanding indictment in 
the United States. 
2. Id. 
3. V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The E&aterritorial Application 
of United States Law, 14 INISL LAW. 257 (1980). 
4. One problem facing the courts is the degree of constitutional protection af- 
forded non-U.S. citizens concerning actions taken by the federal government outside 
the United States. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) 
(holding the Fourth Amendment inapplicable to search and seizure by US. agents 
of property owned by a non-resident alien located in a foreign country). 
One commentator has noted two practical problems being faced as a result of 
the extraterritorial enforcement of United States laws. He explains that: 
In recent years, federal criminal prosecutions, like so much contempo- 
rary civil litigation, have become increasingly complex and frequently 
dependent upon evidence gathered outside the United States. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . Certainly the legacy of the Warren Court was one emphasizing, 
defining and, perhaps, inventing defendant's rights. Many of those legisla- 
tively and judicially mandated protections were doubtless necessary. Their 
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which is the potential violation of international law by adminis- 
trative agencies anxious to enforce their portion of the domestic 
criminal code? Indeed, as one commentator explains, "the drug 
war is one of great political complexity fought on many 
fronts? 
This comment examines some of the international rami- 
fications of United States extraterritorial criminal law enforce- 
ment. Part I1 sets forth the international law of drug enforce- 
ment as codified in multinational treaties and solidified by a 
United Nations convention. Part 111 recounts the history of the 
so-called 'Drug War'' currently being waged by the United 
States and summarizes the current focus of federal drug en- 
forcement efforts. Part IV examines an example of conflict be- 
tween United States drug policy and international law by dis- 
cussing recent legislative efforts to expand the Coast Guard's 
jurisdiction over stateless vessels on the high seas. Part V 
addresses the practical, diplomatic, and philosophical problems 
posed by the United States' ever-expanding criminal law en- 
forcement presence in foreign countries and at sea. This com- 
ment concludes that the international drug war cannot be won 
until domestic demand for drugs decreases. 
Efforts to suppress non-medical narcotics usage and traf- 
ficking are not confined to the United States. Several interna- 
tional conventions sought to curtail illegal drug traffic through 
treaties and agreements in the first half of the twentieth cen- 
tury.' Despite isolationist pressure, the United States became 
result, however, has been to shield further the international criminal, his 
reliance upon domestic protections coupled with offshore secrecy has made 
the pursuit of such violators arduous and their identification and convic- 
tion often impossible. 
S. Cass Weiland, Congress and the Tkansnational Crime Problem, 20 INPI, LAW. 
1025, 1025-34 (1986). 
5. This problem is not a new one. See, e.g., George Schwarzenberger, The 
Problem of an Internutional Criminal Law, 3 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 263 (1950) 
(setting forth the problems of extraterritorial enforcement of domestic laws in the 
first half of the twentieth century). 
6. Neil Darbyshire, The World War on Drugs, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 11, 
1990, at  17. 
7. Some of these early treaties include the following: 1) International Opium 
Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. 612; 2) Agreement Concerning the 
Manufacture of, Internal Trade in and Use of Prepared Opium, Feb. 11, 1925, 51 
L.N.T.S. 337; 3) International Opium Convention, Feb. 19, 1925, 81 L.N.T.S. 317; 
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a party to three of the multinational conventions: The Hague 
International Opium Convention: the Geneva Convention for 
Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of 
Narcotic Drugs: and the Lake Success Protocol.1o The most 
important issue facing these conventions seems to have been 
reaching an agreement on a suitable definition of "illicit nar- 
cotics" so that the worldwide control effort could be unified. 
However, diverse religious customs and usage traditions pre- 
sented a situation where one nation's menace was another 
nation's pastime." This created problems for any concerted 
effort to  curtail drug production and trafficking and prevented 
the conventions from producing an effective international drug 
enforcement treaty. 
Due t o  the ineffectiveness and lack of focus of these early 
treaties, the United Nations held a 1961 conference "For the 
Adoption of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs" (Single 
Convention).12 The Single Convention, which recognized "that 
addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a serious evil for the 
individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to 
mankind,"13 is generally regarded as the present-day interna- 
tional law of drug enforcement.'* The United States was both 
a major instigator and a signatory to both the Single Conven- 
tion and the Geneva Protocol of 1972, which added slight 
4) Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of 
Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. 863; 5) Agreement for the Con- 
trol of Opium Smoking in the Far East, Nov. 27, 1931, 177 L.N.T.S. 373; and 6) 
Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic Drugs, 
Dec. 11, 1946, 61 Stat. 2230, 62 Stat. 1796, T.1A.S. 1671, 1859. 
8. International Opium Convention, Jan. 23, 1912, 38 Stat. 1912, T.S. 612. 
9. Convention for Limiting the Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution of 
Narcotic Drugs, July 13, 1931, 48 Stat. 1543, T.S. 863. 
10. Protocol Amending the Agreements, Conventions and Protocols on Narcotic 
Drugs, Dec. 11, 1946, 61 Stat. 2230, 62 Stat. 1796, T.1A.S. 1671, 1859. 
11. Diversity of custom with regard to controlled substances can even be found 
within the United States. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. 
Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990) (case deals with the sacramental use of peyote by 
Native Americans in contravention of a criminal prohibition on the use of the ha- 
llucinogenic). 
12. Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, done Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6298, 520 U.N.T.S. 204 [hereinafter Single Convention], as amended, 
March 25, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 1439, T.1A.S. No. 8118, 976 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Geneva Protocol]. 
13. Id. at 1409. 
14. There are, of course, other rules of international law that touch upon extra- 
territorial police activity. Some of these, such as the Law of the Sea, will be treat- 
ed below. 
amendments. l5 
The greatest success of the Single Convention is its widely 
accepted list of controlled or controllable substance defin- 
tions.l6 Based upon this substance list, the Single Convention 
requires each party nation to furnish annual necessity esti- 
mates for expected medicinal, religious, and scientific use for 
each controlled narcotic." 
The thrust of the Single Convention is individual sovereign 
responsibility. The substantive provisions essentially commit 
party nations to unilaterally stop the illegal manufacture, im- 
portation, exportation, and use of drugs within their own terri- 
tories." Thus, by setting controls and by encouraging each 
nation to make educated estimates on its medicinal and scien- 
tific drug needs, the Single Convention attempts to fight drug 
smuggling on a manageable, national level. 
However, because the international community assumed 
that party nations would accept their individual responsibilities 
in good faith, no provision of the Single Convention authorizes 
or prohibits international enforcement or extraterritorial police 
action by any nation or by the United Nations collectively. In 
light of this fact, United States anti-drug efforts have veered 
toward extraterritorial enforcement. 
15. As of January 1, 1990, the following Western Hemisphere nations were par- 
ties to the 1972 Geneva Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs: 
Argentina, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colum- 
bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad & Tobago, Unit- 
ed States, Uruguay and Venezuela. El Salvador is a party to the Protocol, but not 
the Single Convention. TREATIES IN FORCE, U.S. DEPV OF STATE, 351-52 (1990). 
16. Schedule I lists 78 drugs that are completely subject to all controlling sec- 
tions of the Single Convention. Schedule I1 lists another 7 substances that are 
more readily medicinal and are therefore less controlled. Single Convention, 18 
U.S.T. at 1559-61. 
The listings of controlled substances set forth in the Single Convention were subse- 
quently amended by the 1972 Geneva Protocol, supra note 12, which reaffirms the 
substantive provisions of the earlier agreement. 
17. Among the internationally illegal drugs specified in the Single Convention's 
provisions are: opium, coca and its progeny (cocaine, crack, etc.), and cannabis. 
Single Convention, 18 U.S.T. at 1419-21. The Convention also obliges all parties to 
"limit exclusively to medical and scientific purposes the production, manufacture, 
export, import, distribution of, trade in, use and possession of [the listed] drugs." 
Id. at 1413. 
18. Article 31 provides that: "The Parties shall not knowingly permit the export 
of drugs to any country or territory except: (a) In accordance with the laws and 
regulations of that country or territory; and (b) Within the limits of the total of 
the estimates for that country or territory as defined [by the country]." Id. at 1422. 
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Despite the publicity and political rhetoric, the Reagan- 
Bush "War on Drugs" is nothing new. President Richard Nixon 
predated the current emotional battle by declaring a drug war 
of his own.lg In addition, Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald 
Ford both directed substantial efforts to  curtail the flow of 
drugs into the United States. 
A. History of United States Drug Enforcement Efforts 
Federal government suppression of illicit narcotics in the 
United States actually dates back to the registration and reve- 
nue provisions of the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 (Harrison 
The Harrison Ad regulated the sale and use of narcot- 
ics, such as opium and cocaine, by taxing their consumption 
and importation. Heightened fears of the hannfid effects of 
narcotics led to  increasingly stringent amendments to  the Har- 
rison Act, as well as the passage of other, more restrictive mea- 
s u r e ~ . ~ ~  By the mid 19208, "there was no legal source of co- 
caine [or other opiate narcotics] in the United States for non- 
surgical use."22 
The federal government continued to fight the consumption 
of drugs, but found that large quantities were being imported 
into the United States from other nations. Because of this trou- 
bling trend, the United States subscribed to several of the early 
multinational ~onventions.~~ The United States was one of the 
major instigators of the Single Convention, and U.S. drug en- 
forcement officials eagerly anticipated international consensus 
on the drug problem.2" 
- 
However, it soon became apparent to United States offi- 
cials that the Single Convention did not provide the weaponry 
necessary to wage an international drug war. The ideal behind 
the Single Convention is that each nation wage the drug war 
within own borders. This unilateral control approach fal- 
19. See generally EDWARD I. EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR (1977). 
20. Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (the Ad was codified into the 
Internal Revenue Code in 1939). 
21. Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War On Cocaine: The Futility and Des tm-  
tiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1312-14 (1983). 
22. Id. at 1313. 
23. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
24. See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text. 
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tered because drug suppression was apparently a much higher 
priority in the U.S. than in the other Single Convention na- 
tions. Particularly discouraging to United States' efforts was 
the lack of enforcement in those developing countries that sup- 
ply the majority of illicit narcotics. Despite the signatory prom- 
ises of these "producer" nations to reduce drug trafficking, 
illegal narcotics smuggling continued to increase worldwide. 
To combat this trend, the United States entered into a 
number of criminal enforcement treaties with other n a t i o d 5  
These bilateral treaties typically include provisions for the 
extradition to  the U.S. of accused criminals in the custody of 
party nations.26 Although these treaties had many other use- 
ful purposes besides the fight to curtail drug trafficking, the 
narcotics control value of such treaties was appreciated by 
federal government offi~ials.~' Even with the extradition trea- 
ties in place, however, "the obstacles to effective suppression of 
[illicit drugs] a t  the source seem[ed] as insuperable as the bar- 
riers to enforcement within the United  state^.'^' 
One of the major offensives in President Nixon's drug war 
was the formation of a new agency to deal with the narcotics 
problem. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the 
principle drug enforcement agency of the federal government, 
was created in 1973.~~ DENS mission is principally to wage 
25. See generally Kevin Fisher, Note, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics Con- 
trol: Slamming the Stable Door After the Horse Has Bolted, 16 N.Y.U. J .  OF IWL 
L. & POL. 353 (1984). 
26. The United States has greatly expanded the number of bilateral extradition 
treaties to which it is a party. Between 1960 and 1969, the United States was a 
party to extradition treaties with the following nations: Brazil, Israel, Kenya, Mala- 
wi, Singapore, and Sweden. Id. at 366-67 11.90. 
Between 1970 and 1978, however, the Unites States concluded treaties with the 
following sixteen countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, France, 
Germany, Italy, Kiribati, Paraguay, Saint Lucia, Solomon Islands, Spain, Swazi- 
land, Tuvali, and the United Kingdom. Id. 
27. See Oversight Hearings on Federal Dncg Strategy: Hearings Before the 
House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 381 
(1979) (statement by Irving Nathan, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal 
Division, Justice Department). 
28. Wisotsky, supm note 21, at 1335. The "barriers" include an ever-increasing 
demand for illicit narcotics within the United States, social acceptance of some 
drug usage, shrinking drug enforcement budgets in many jurisdictions and the 
increasing difficulty in gaining convictions for drug related criminal conduct. 
29. Id. at 1352. While DEA as an entity is relatively new, its history dates 
back to enforcement of the Harrison Narcotics Ad of 1914, when 162 IRS 
collectorlagents were assigned to the Miscellaneous Division to enforce the revenue 
provisions of the Act. Id. at 1352 11.253. DEA is currently an arm of the FBI, 
although both agencies enjoy a remarkable amount of autonomy. It has been noted 
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the drug war at  home and abroad through information gather- 
ing, surveillance, procuring evidence, and actual enforcement of 
United States drug laws.30 
B. Recent Drug Enforcement Efforts and Current Focus 
The current overseas control policy of the United States 
operates within a framework of foreign assistance legislation, 
that this freedom often causes the two organizations to cross jurisdictions. For an 
extended history of DEA function delegation, see id. 
30. DEA activities in the United States are very similar to those of the FBI. 
DEA extraterritorial activities, however, are markedly different fiom those under- 
taken by any previous organization. DEA has described its international assistance 
activities as follows: 
A. Criminal drug information collection and exchange directly support 
intelligence production and prosecution of defendants in the United States 
and the host countries. These efforts include: 
-Development of sources of information knowledgeable of illicit cul- 
tivation, production, and transportation activities. 
-Undercover penetration of traflhking organizations in support of 
host country operations. 
-Suweillance assistance and development of evidence against major 
tr&ckers of drugs destined for the United States. 
-Provide host countries with information for effective enforcement 
programs. 
-Participation with foreign officers in pursuing investigative leads. 
-Coordination of matters regarding extraditions, expulsions, joint 
prosecutions and requests for judicial assistance. 
-Acquisition and transmittal to the United States of drug samples 
supplied by foreign government officers for laboratory analyses to deter- 
mine the origin of drugs destined for the United States. 
B. Traditional drug intelligence activities conducted overseas concur- 
rently with the foregoing involve the identification and dissemination of 
information collection requirements, collection against these requirements 
by special agents, initiation of Special Field Intelligence programs, analyti- 
cal research processing, and the production and dissemination of 
tacticalloperational and strategic foreign intelligence. 
C. Liaison, which is central to the DEA foreign mission includes vis- 
its, briefings, exchanges and contacts with foreign law enforcement offi- 
cials to encourage cooperation and development of effective host country 
drug enforcement capability and commitment. 
D. DEA conducts a variety of international training programs which 
are funded by the Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotic 
Matters: Five-week Advanced International Drug Enforcement schools, 
two-week in-country training schools, two to four week executive obsewa- 
tion programs, instructor training programs, intelligence collection and 
analysis schools, three-week forensic chemist seminars, and sponsor the 
International Drug Enforcement Officers Association Conferences. 
Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, and the Judiciary and Related Agen- 
cies Appropriations for 1983, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on 
Appropriations, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 632-33 (1982). 
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international law, and the above-mentioned bilateral agree- 
ments with narcotic producing countrie~.~' The various organi- 
zations fighting the influx of drugs have repeatedly stated that 
crop control is the "fwst priority."32 This philosophy has led to 
"intensified programs intended to suppress the drug at its 
source by destroying illegal coca plants" and encouraging the 
development of substitute crops.33 Congress has appropriated 
billions of dollars in economic and military aid to this effort, 
using such aid as an incentive for the cooperation of the finan- 
cially struggling Latin American countries that contribute most 
heavily to the production of drugs.* 
During recent episodes of the drug conflict, "war" has be- 
come the most appropriate designation. While only the Coast 
Guard participated in the enforcement of drug laws abroad 
throughout the 19708, military force became a more viable and 
usable option to the Reagan and Bush Administrations. The 
military branches participated in a series of jungle strikes 
against Bolivian drug manufacturers in 1986.35 The Coast 
Guard's role and jurisdiction have also expanded. 
The use of military force by nations to suppress the impor- 
tation of narcotics is international in scope. As one newspaper 
recently reported: 
With the Royal Navy on cocaine patrol in the Caribbean, SAS 
and American military advisers assisting enforcement agen- 
cies from the jungles of Peru to the mountains of the north- 
west frontier, and [the 20,000-plus] regular U.S. troops [for- 
merly] occupying Panama, anti-drug measures have been 
elevated from disparate local policing actions to a series of 
major military actions. Even satellites and the latest Star 
Wars technology are used to spot illicit crops.' 
The drug barons have responded to  this concerted attack on 
their power base with military offensives of their own." 
31. Wisotsky, supra note 21, at 1335. 
32. See Intenational Narcotics Control: Hearings Before the House Comrn. on 
Foreign Aftcairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 156 (1982) (cited in Wisotsky, supm note 21, 
at 1335 11.144). 
33. Wisotsky, supm note 21, at 1335. 
34. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
35. See Paul Berg, Drugs and Rights,. President% War Faces Legal Challenges, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1986, at Z9; Juan de Onis, Bolivia Leader Asks 'Global Appr- 
oach' on Drugs, LA. TIMES, July 25, 1986, 8 1, at 25, col. 1. 
36. Darbyshire, supra note 6, at 17. 
37. Id. The report continues, 
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Somewhere in this expansion of extraterritorial police 
activity, United States policy was bound to confront the re- 
straining principles of customary international law. One of the 
areas in which U.S. policy apparently conflicts with interna- 
tional law is in the exercise of jurisdiction over stateless ves- 
sels. 
A major emphasis of the Nixon Administration's drug war 
was to increase the Coast Guard's participation in the enforce- 
ment effort. The Coast Guard continues to be a major player in 
the drug crackdown today. Because this participation often 
involves enforcement activity on the high seas, basic principles 
of international jurisdiction are involved.38 
The central conflict is between the long-standing notion 
that vessels are free to navigate the waters of the high seas, 
and the equally compelling duty of nations to protect citizens 
from evils that may lurk beyond territorial boundaries. In this 
sense, the struggle over the United States' drug enforcement 
policy on the high seas captures the essence of the tension 
between domestic and international law. 
A. General Jurisdictional Principles 
Professor Henkin has summed up the law of the sea, writ- 
ing that "[flor hundreds of years the basic principle of the law 
of the seas has been freedom. With i b r  beneath it-has been 
the principle that the sea belonged to everyone, or to no 
one."39 
The 1958 United Nations Convention on the High Seas 
In Colombia the heavily armed cocaine cartel made an audacious declara- 
tion of war on the Government. In Peru, Burma and Sri Lanka the bar- 
ons have linked with guerrilla armies fighting to overthrow the govern- 
ments. In Afghanistan the opium fields are protected by local warlords, 
once supplied with arms by the U.S. In Lebanon and other Middle East- 
ern countries, drug money is a major contributor to the war effort-in 
Laos heroin smuggling is government policy. 
Id. 
38. The questions presented are basic to the concept of international law, and 
the philosophical side of these questions is considered below. See infh notes 84-92 
and accompanying text. 
39. Louis Henkin, Changing Law for the Changing Seas, in USES OF THE SEAS 
69, 70 (Edmund A. Guillin ed., 1968). 
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("Convention") echoes this sentiment by stating that "[tlhe high 
seas [are] open to all nations," and "no State may validly pur- 
port to subject any part of them to its s~vereignty."~~ The codi- 
fication of this principle by the Convention has been ratified 
and signed by the United States.'" 
Despite this far-reaching principle, nations occasionally 
extend their jurisdiction beyond their borders. In Rivard v. 
United  state^:^ the Fifth Circuit announced the following five 
basic international principles upon which nations traditionally 
assert extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction: (1) the passive 
personality principle, (2) the nationality principle, (3) the uni- 
versality principle, (4) the territoriality principle, and (5) the 
protective principle.43 Based upon one or more of these princi- 
ples, nations just* extending their jurisdiction over individu- 
als beyond national boundaries and the normal reach of domes- 
tic law enforcement. 
The "passive personality principle" provides for jurisdiction 
when the victim of a crime is a state citizen? This jurisdic- 
tional basis recognizes the interest nations have in protecting 
40. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2314, 
450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter Convention]. Article 2 further provides that: 
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down 
by these articles and by the other rules of international law. It comprises, 
inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States: 
1) Freedom of navigation; 
2) Freedom of fishing; 
3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; 
4) Freedom to fly over the high seas. 
These freedoms, and others which are recognized by the general prin- 
ciples of international law, shall be exercised by all States with reason- 
able regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the free- 
dom of the high seas. 
Id. 
41. Despite the Convention's universal language, courts in the United States 
have held that its provisions do not apply to everyone. In United States v. Monroy, 
614 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit held that where a vessel was deter- 
mined to be registered in a country which had not signed the Convention on the 
High Seas (in this case Panama), neither the defendants boarded and arrested by 
the Coast Guard nor the Republic of Panama could raise restrictions of the treaty 
on the exercise of jurisdiction over foreign vessels on the high seas as a bar to 
prosecution. See gemrally Andrew W .  Anderson, Jurisdiction Over Stateless Vessels 
on the High Seas: An Appraisal Under Domestic and Intenational Law, 13 J .  MAR. 
L. & COM. 323 (1982). 
42. 375 F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967). 
43. Id. at 885. 
44. Peter D. Clark, Criminal Jurisdiction over Merchant Vessels Engaged in 
International lhde, 11 J .  MAR. L. & COM. 219, 221 (1980). 
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their citizens throughout the world. While the U.S. could 
stretch this doctrine to justify extraterritorial police activity by 
classifying the victims of drug trafkking as U.S. citizens, pas- 
sive personality is not currently recognized by the United 
States. 
The "nationality principle" provides for jurisdiction when 
the perpetrator of the crime is a citizen of that natiod5 While 
states may not normally make arrests within the territory of 
another state, arrests made on the high seas based upon this 
principle are generally considered legal? This principle theo- 
retically aids the prosecution of U.S. citizens overseas, but by 
definition does not just* the arrest of aliens outside United 
States territory. 
The "universality principle" gives a nation jurisdiction 
when the criminal offender is within the custody of that nation, 
wherever the crime took place. Port countries generally avail 
themselves of this category. The theory is that the port country 
is in a better position to enforce its criminal laws than another 
en tit^.^' Universally condemned crimes, regardless of the 
crime locale, may be punished by any nation if that state has 
custody of the offender." Should the United States adopt this 
jurisdictional theory, an argument could be made that drug 
trafficking is a "universally condemned crime" under the Single 
Convention of 1961.~~ 
The "territoriality principle" extends jurisdiction when the 
criminal act either takes place within the territory of a given 
country, or when the effects of the act harm that c0untry.6~ 
United States courts have cited this theory as a major justifi- 
cation of extraterritorial jurisdiction over drug smugglers on 
the high seas and elsewhere.'l The reasoning may stem from 
federal criminal legislation that defines drug usage and traf- 
ficking as "a specific threat to  the security and societal well- 
45. Id. at 220. 
46. Id. at221. 
47. Id. at 222. 
48. Id. 
49. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
50. Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885-86 (5th Cir.); Clark, supra note 
44, at 220. 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 832 (1979); United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1978), over- 
ruled on other g r o u d ,  United States v. William, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(en banc). 
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being of the United  state^."^^ As such a threat, international 
enforcement is supposedly justified. 
Finally, the "protective principle" gives a jurisdictional 
basis to  laws enacted by a nation that prohibit extraterritorial 
acts that either threaten that nation's security or somehow 
interfere with a government's proper functioning.53 The con- 
cept is that actions which threaten sovereignty or security may 
be punished by the threatened state. It is possible that mere 
semantic shifting (for example, codification of the perceived 
"threat") may invoke the protective principle. By using the 
words "specific threat to the security" of the United States, the 
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act effectively accomplishes 
this.54 
B.The Stateless Vessel Problem 
Due largely to the Nixon, Ford and Carter Administrations' 
increased monetary commitment to the war on drugs, the Coast 
Guard used its extra equipment and manpower to become more 
effective in apprehending traffickers during the 1970s. Unfortu- 
nately, the fixit of this heightened activity was negated by 
technical legal factors. One commentator summed up this peri- 
od of the drug war by noting that 
[als the Coast Guard became more and more proficient at 
intercepting smugglers by stationing vessels at the 'choke 
points' in the Caribbean, the tide had turned against the 
Federal prosecutors in the courtroom. While the Coast Guard 
was beginning to win the 'Drug War' on the high seas, the 
lack of adequate legal weapons was turning the prosecutorial 
fight into a rout." 
One of the thorns in the side of United States drug enforce- 
ment efforts is the use of stateless vessels by drug smugglers. 
Traffickers often "risk not registering their ships or flying any 
convenient flag to elude detection" and frustrate prosecution." 
Beginning in the 19708, marijuana smugglers employed a dis- 
tribution technique known affectionately as the "mother ship" 
52. 46 U.S.C. 5 1902 (1990). 
53. Clark, supra note 44, at 221-22. 
54. 46 U.S.C. 5 1902 (1990). For an argument that illicit drugs pose no such 
security threat, see Wisotsky, supra note 21. 
55. Anderson, supra note 41, at 325. 
56. See generally Patrick Sasek, Note, Jurisdiction Over Drug Smuggling on the 
High Seas: It's a Small World After All, 44 U. PPLT. L. REV. 1095, 1098 (1983). 
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method: 
[A] large ship, typically a converted fishing vessel, meets 
smaller powerboats . . . at a designated point in waters off the 
United States coast. Even fblly loaded, the powerboats can 
outrace the vessels in the Coast Guard fleet. The mother ship 
may cruise or simply float in international water until its 
cargo is delivered. Though often unregistered, or registered in 
a different country than indicated, the mother ship is made to 
appear properly identified to take advantage of the principle 
of undisturbed navigation on the high seas. Unless the Coast 
Guard follows internationally accepted practice, its seizure of 
a foreign ship in international waters violates the most h d a -  
mental rule underlying freedom of the seas, that no nation 
may assert sovereignty over the high seas." 
This method is still used today as a major trafTkking device, 
and drug smugglers continue to raise violations of international 
law as a defense when apprehended on the high seas. In par- 
ticular, they argue that freedom of navigation is a fundamental 
right, respected by all nations and dating to antiquity; during 
most of the 19708, United States cows agreed.58 Thus, the 
problem of stateless vessels escaping criminal responsibility 
plagued drug enforcement efforts until Congress took steps to 
eradicate the problem. 
C. The Congressional Response 
Generally, the Coast Guard defines its jurisdiction precise- 
ly as ordered by either the President, as Commander in Chief, 
or Congress, under the common defense and general welfare 
power. Several recent bills manifest congressional intent to 
toughen maritime drug laws and ultimately expand the reach 
of the Coast Guard and other drug enforcement agencies. One 
such bill was the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act 
of 1970 ("Comprehensive Act")," which repealed the prior 
hodgepodge of criminal drug legislation and "consolidated all 
Federal law in the area into one act.&' 
This consolidation created a major problem for the Coast 
Guard. Due to congressional oversight, all laws regarding pos- 
57. Id. 
58. See Anderson, supra note 41, at 324-26. 
59. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 
84 Stat. 1236 (1970). 
60. Anderson, supra note 41, at 324. 
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session of illegal drugs aboard U.S. vessels on the high seas 
had been repealed by the Comprehensive Act without being 
subsequently replacede6' Under federal drug enforcement stat- 
utes valid shortly after passage of the Comprehensive Act, drug 
smugglers apprehended on the high seas could only be charged 
with "conspiracy to import drugs into the United  state^.'^ 
However, because this change requires proof of intent, it was 
mcult for federal prosecutors to prove their cases.63 
A .  equally diacult problem was that of asserting United 
States jurisdiction over foreign nationals aboard foreign ves- 
sels." Although such arrests on the high seas were seemingly 
within several general principles of extraterritorial criminal 
jurisdiction,B5 United States courts often dismissed charges 
against foreign smugglers. Noting a general distinction between 
arrests made within United States territory, and those made 
on the high seas, many courts typically premised the dismissals 
on the notion that Congress had not expressly justified the 
expansion of jurisdiction beyond U.S. territorial waters? Low 
conviction rates on high seas arrests had a chilling effect on 
drug prosecutions. For example, difficulty of conviction forced 
the United States Attorney's Office to decline prosecution in 
almost fifty percent of the seizures made by the Coast Guard 
during the period between September 1, 1976 and March 28, 
1979.~' 
Congress finally remedied the situation by amending the 
61. Id. 
62. Id. 
63. A good example of this problem is the case of the Panamanian freighter 
Don EmiZio, which was found to be hovering just outside United States waters 
with 70,000 pounds of marijuana on board, but prosecution was declined for lack of 
proof of the intent of the 24 crew members to introduce the marijuana into the 
United States. Anderson, supm note 41, at 325 (citing Hearings on H.R. 2538 
Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Mer- 
chant Marine and Fisheries, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. 64) (statement of Michael P. 
Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, Southern 
District of Florida). 
64. 
65. In particular, the territoriality and protective principles could be applied. 
See supm notes 41-53 and accompanying text (discussing principles of extraterrito- 
rial criminal jurisdiction). 
66. Anderson, supra note 41, at 325. 
67. See id. at 326 (citing Hearings on H.R. 2538 Before the Subcomm. on Coast 
Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
96th Cong., 1st Sess 65 (1979) (statement of Michael P. Sullivan, Assistant United 
States Attorney, Chief, Criminal Division, Southern District of Florida)). 
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Comprehensive Act in 1980.68 A new section explicitly prohib- 
ited "any person on board a vessel of the United States, or on 
board a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 
on the high seas, to knowingly or intentionally manufacture or 
distribute, or possess with intent to manufacture or distribute, 
a controlled substance.*9 The same restrictions applied to any 
United States citizen on board any vessel.70 
Congress further expanded the Coast Guard's high seas 
reaching power by proclaiming that a "[vlessel subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States' includes a vessel without 
nationality or a vessel assimilated to a vessel without nation- 
ality . . . ."?' This definition could be easily criticized as an 
unreasonable expansion of United States influence and as vio- 
lative of the long-standing principle of freedom of navigation. 
Congress subsequently repealed section 955a, and then in 
1986 replaced it with a provision that asserts even more juris- 
diction over the high seas. As mentioned above," the Mar- 
itime Drug Enforcement Act (MDEA) declared that "trafficking 
in controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious internation- 
al problem and is universally condemned," and that it "presents 
a specific threat to the security and societal well-being of the 
United  state^."?^ 
Official federal government entities realize that the present 
MDEA may violate international law. The State Department 
has cited the United Nations Convention of the High Seas and 
specifically noted the potential international ramifications, but 
nevertheless endorsed the MDEA. It advised that 
under international law a country may not assert jurisdiction 
over a vessel of another country sailing on the high seas ex- 
cept in rare circumstances. . . . There is also an exception 
which allows us to board a vessel on the high seas which is 
without nationality, that is one which is not registered in a 
foreign state or which can be assimilated to a vessel without 
nationality under paragraph 2 of article 6 of the Convention 
on the High Seas . . . . 
While ordinarily the United States does not favor a uni- 
lateral extension of jurisdiction by the United States over the 
68. 21 U.S.C. 5 955 (1988). 
69. Id. 8 955a(a) (1982). 
70. Id. 8 955a(b) (1982). 
71. Id. 8 955b(d) (1982). 
72. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
73. 46 U.S.C. $ 1902 (1988). 
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activities of non-US. citizens on board stateless vessels with- 
out proof of some connection to the United States, the serious 
nature of this problem, and the fact that persons on board 
these stateless vessels are engaged in narcotics trafficking 
aimed a t  the United States, warrant an extension in this 
particular case. . . . The Department of State strongly sup- 
ports the intent of [this Act]." 
The United States continues to assert jurisdiction over state- 
less vessels on the high seas when those vessels appear to be 
involved in illegal activities. 
D. Explaining United States Policy and Actions 
Courts and official agencies have given a number of seem- 
ingly valid justifications for the expansion of jurisdiction. As 
noted above, two internationally recognized bases of extraterri- 
torial jurisdiction (the territoriality and protective principles) 
revolve around the definition of "threat" to  either sovereignty 
or security." The territoriality principle justifies jurisdiction 
based upon foreign activities having potential effects within a 
state, while the protective principle justifies actions to eradi- 
cate definite, specific threats to  the state. Governments are 
clearly entitled to define what they consider "a threat" and to 
74. Anderson, supra note 41, at 334 (citing Hearings on H.R. 2583 Before the 
Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on Merchant Ma- 
rine and Fisheries, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. 55-56 (1979) (statement of Morris D. 
Busby, Director, Office of Ocean Affairs, OES Bureau, Department of State). The 
"rare circumstances" contemplated by the State Department here are those listed in 
Article 22 of the Convention on the High Seas, which provides, in relevant portion, 
that: 
1 . . . . [A] warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the 
high seas is not justified in boarding her unless there is reasonable 
ground for suspecting: 
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or 
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or 
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the 
ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. 
2. In the [above situations], the warship may proceed to verify the 
ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the 
command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after 
the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further examina- 
tion on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible con- 
sideration. 
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 2318, 450 U.N.T.S. 
82. 
75. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text. 
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protect themselves against the menace, so long as the protec- 
tive actions do not violate the sovereignty of other nations. 
Similarly, customary international law has adapted to 
protect the maritime rights of all nations. As one commentator 
has observed, "[tlhe high seas are not res nullius, subject to the 
jurisdiction of no nation, but res communis, subject to the com- 
mon jurisdiction of all nations."" This spirit of mutual protec- 
tion has spawned the custom of vessel registration. 
It has long been established "that the only conclusive evi- 
dence of the nationality of a vessel is found in the documents 
required by international law and custom to be furnished by 
the flag state and carried aboard the One scholar 
has noted that a vessel's documentation by the issuance of 
appropriate papers establishing her true nationality "is older 
than international law itself and extends back before the era of 
the ~ o m a n s . " ~ ~  All maritime nations presently require some 
kind of vessel registration." The current adoption of this an- 
cient principle is embodied in Article 6 of the United Nations 
Convention on the High Seas.'' 
Registration of ships serves many purposes: safety control 
over each nation's fleet, state protection of individual vessels 
and sailors, identification for communication between ships, 
and organization for the various requirements of the general 
maritime law and any civil claims that may arise on the sea. 
Perhaps the most important reason is that the order of the seas 
depends upon registration. One article notes the necessity of 
strict adherence to this practice: 
Every ship is required to have a national character and scant 
protection is afforded to ships which have no nationality . . . . 
76. Anderson, supra note 41, at 336. 
77. Id. at 339. 
78. Rienow, The Test of the Nationali6y of a Memhant Vessel, 155 (1937). 
79. Id. 
80. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2313, 2315, 450 
U.N.T.S. 82 (1958). Article 6 provides in relevant portion: 
1. Ships shall sail under the flag of one State only and, save in 
exceptional cases expressly provided for in international treaties or 
in these articles, shall be subject to its exclusive jurisdiction on the 
high seas . . . . 
2. A ship which sails under the flags of two or more States, using 
them according to convenience, may not claim any of the nation- 
alities in question with respect to any other State, and may be 
assimilated to a ship without nationality. 
Id. 
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. . . 
So great a premium is placed upon the certain identifica- 
tion of vessels for purposes of maintaining minimal order 
upon the high seas . . . that extraordinary deprivational mea- 
sures are permitted with respect to stateless ships. Thus, it is 
commonly considered that ships either having no nationality 
or falsely assuming a nationality are almost completely with- 
out prote~tion.~~ 
Legislative actions that expand jurisdiction over stateless 
vessels on the high seas actually follow a principle of American 
jurisprudence. In United States u. Cortes,8' the Fifth Circuit 
seemed to agree with the above quoted passage and said that 
"[s]tateless vessels are not entitled to the same protection af- 
forded vessels registered in a foreign nation which is a signato- 
ry of the [High Seas] Con~ention."~~ 
This distinction between the rights afforded registered 
vessels and the rights of stateless vessels, although widely 
accepted, is hardly universal. Many critics argue that jurisdic- 
tion over stateless vessels on the high seas is "inimical to  the 
exercise of freedom of the seas by United States commercial 
vessels and threatens the country's security and governmental 
functions."* 
An argument could be made that freedom of navigation is 
an individual rather than a national right, and that mariners 
who choose t o  sail without the protections and conveniences of 
a home port should be dlowed to do so without harassment. 
While convincing from an individual right's standpoint, this 
argument appears to  have been soundly rejected by the inter- 
national community. "Although . . . it is an acknowledged viola- 
tion of international law for one nation to enforce its law with- 
in the sovereign territory of another nation without permission, 
the wrong is one under international and not domestic law."" 
A person arrested under such circumstances cannot raise the 
defense when brought before U.S. courts. The action arguably 
violates the sovereign integrity and jurisdiction of the foreign 
81. Myres S. McDougal et. al., The Maintenance of Public Order at Sea and the 
Nationalitly of Ships, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 25, 27, 76-77 (emphasis added). 
82. 588 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1979). 
83. Id. at 110. The Seventh Circuit followed the same rationale and reached a 
similar result. See United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1979). 
84. Anderson, supra note 41, at 338. 
85. Id. at 329. 
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nation and the defense is for that nation to raise." Similarly, 
freedom of navigation over the high seas is generally consid- 
ered a right granted to  all nations, which then funnel the right 
to  individual citizens upon any condition set by the sovereign. 
From a practical standpoint, rejection of the "individual 
freedom of navigation" argument reflects the wisdom of the 
ages. The principal beneficiaries of this "right," if acknowl- 
edged, would be those likely to  be involved in piracy, drug 
trafficking or other maritime mischief. The widespread interna- 
tional custom of vessel registration poses quite an inconve- 
nience to such persons. 
Thus, we may conclude from the authorities and interna- 
tional treaty law that expanding jurisdiction over stateless 
vessels on the high seas is a legally acceptable leap for the 
United States to  make. Problems with jurisdiction over state- 
less vessels is just one legal problem facing prosecutors of the 
drug war. Other problems include dual criminality and R.I.C.O. 
issues that the courts are still attempting to  resolve. Beyond 
the legal questions loom other problems that must be recog- 
nized and dealt with. 
V. PROBLEMS WITH THE EXTRATERRITORIAL WAR ON DRUGS 
Despite seemingly spectacular successes, manifested 
through increased confiscation tonnage and arrest rates, the 
drug war in South America is not going well.87 There are 
practical, diplomatic, and philosophical problems that need t o  
be addressed in any honest appraisal of the drug war. 
A. Practical Problems 
Critics of the drug war point at discouraging statistics and 
argue that we are waging an international war that cannot be 
won. 'We are not so much fighting a war as weeding a garden," 
one experienced Customs officer explained in a recent newspa- 
per article. "At least in a war," he continued, "the enemy can be 
killed. With drugs, it seems that no sooner have you knocked 
out one opponent than another one steps up to  take his 
place? 
86. Id. 
87. Joseph B. Treaster, Faltering Drug War: The Flow from Latin America-4 
Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1990, at 1, col. 1. 
88. Darbyshire, supra note 6,  at 17. 
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The war is often painted as a vast chess game with multi- 
billion dollar consequences. 'The dramatic expansion in the size 
of the black market," writes one commentator, "demonstrates 
the inability of domestic law enforcement agencies to suppress 
the importation of [illicit narcotics] into the United  state^."'^ 
For every law enforcement move there is a smuggling 
countermove. Smugglers often respond to Customs actions "by 
using counter-intelligence, decoy shipments, and such disinfor- 
mation as false 'tips7.'*' 
Another problem in this age of deficit-consciousness is the 
price tag of the drug war. President Bush's recent campaign to 
stop cocaine at its source includes $2 billion in economic aid to 
Peru, Bolivia and Colombia over four years. In addition, the 
plan includes $261 million in aid mainly to the military and 
police in those ~ountries.~' This policy of discouraging drug 
production may eventually produce some desired results. How- 
ever, the consensus among critics is that the plan is a financial 
di~aster. '~ To these economic aid "incentives" we must add the 
price of military advisers and combat personnel used in many 
drug enforcement  operation^.^^ Similarly, the frightening and 
costly increase in federal and state court docket congestion 
directly results from the recent escalation of drug prosecutions. 
The cost in time, judicial resources, and money for the court- 
house machinery can be immense. Needless to say, the drug 
war is not without its disadvantages. Some of these costs enter 
into our diplomatic relations. 
89. Wisotsky, supra note 21, at  1334-35. 
90. Id. at 1350. 
91. Treaster, supra note 87, at 1, col. 1. 
92. Professor Wisotsky writes that: 
In the very long term, of course, it is possible that the development 
of a modern socioeconomic infrastructure will transform the conditions of 
life in Andean Peru and Bolivia and thereby facilitate the control of coca 
and cocaine production. Failing such a transformation, however, neither 
the United States nor the source countries can achieve significant limita- 
tions on the supply of coca for cocaine without resorting to some radical 
or violent technical "fix" such as military occupation of the coca-growing 
regions. Even then, it is doubtful whether the weak governments involved 
have the political and economic power to sustain such repression over the 
long term. 
Wisotsky, supra note 21, at 1347. 
93. See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Fires On Ship Believed Carrying Drugs Mexico, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1990, at Al, col. 4 (recounting an unsuccessful two and one- 
half hour Coast Guard barrage on a Cuban owned, Panamanian.flagged vessel that 
avoided boarding). 
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B. Diplomatic Problems 
The drug war is responsible for furthering the diplomatic 
woes of the United States in its relations with developing coun- 
tries. Particularly with the nations of Central and South Amer- 
ica, the drug war is often viewed as yet another attempt by the 
coloso del norte to impose its will upon the sovereignty and 
dignity of its neighbor nations. For example, the attack on 
Panama successfully felled Noriega but alienated Peru, a far 
more important player in the drug 
Even among our South American "drug allies" there is 
great dissent. It is becoming increasingly clear that for the 
Andean nations, cutting cocaine production and exports is by 
no means their number one pri~rity.~' Few analysts realisti- 
cally believe that these nations have the manpower, equipment 
or desire to wage war on their own citizens who often depend 
on coca and marijuana crops as their sole economic subsis- 
tence.' While we cannot win the drug war alone, South and 
Central American nations are unwilling to win it for us 
C. Philosophical Problems 
Back in 1950, one commentator observed that international 
law is, by definition, dependent upon the whims of popular 
political ideol~gies.~' This holds true today. It has been argued 
that because the premises are always changing, international 
law is viewed as an ineffective tool to  deal with the problems of 
nations.98 
94. Citing disapproval of the United States military action, Peru pulled out of 
an Andean summit meeting with President Bush and briefly halted an anti-drug 
effort with the United States. Efforts to improve the U.S. working relationship 
with Peru have thus far failed to completely rectify a situation that was far more 
favorable in the weeks preceding the Panamanian occupation. See Treaster, supra 
note 87, at 1, col. 1. 
95. Id. 
96. See generally Wisotsky, supra note 21 (noting the economic factors which 
provide incentives to Latin American farmers to produce drug producing plants 
such as coca). 
97. Schwarzenberger, supra note 5, at 263 ("International lawyers-with the ex- 
ception of those immunised [sic] by the atmospheric conditions prevailing in the 
legal departments of Foreign Offices-are prone to suffer from a professional dis- 
ease against which other members of the legal profession are remarkably immune. 
They appear to be highly susceptible to current fashions in the realm of political 
ideology"). 
98. See JOSEPH M .  SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 1261- 
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International law often poses little restraint on actions 
taken by the United States. Indeed, U.S. courts may (and often 
do) disregard international law when it conflicts with domestic 
law.g9 The Fifth Circuit exemplified this attitude in United 
States v. Howard-Arias.''' The court stated that "[tlhe United 
States may violate international law principles in order to 
effectively carry out this nation's p~licies."'~' While this atti- 
tude is not demonstrative of all opinions, other courts have 
enunciated similar rules when domestic policies conflict with 
international law. lo2 
Legislative language is no more supportive of international 
legal principles. The Maritime Drug Enforcement Act mandates 
that "failure to comply with international law should not divest 
a court of jurisdiction or otherwise constitute a defense to any 
proceeding under [the Act]."1o3 
This observed rejection of international law by Congress 
and the judiciary is by no means absolute. The Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations notes that "Courts in the United 
States are bound to give effect to international law and inter- 
national agreements . . . ."lo4 Generally, courts in the United 
States do everything possible to construe domestic law in a 
manner consistent with international law, and vice-versa.lo5 
When such a construction is not possible, courts must bow to 
the constitutional will of Congress. 
Perhaps the most important and far-reaching detriment to  
the drug war is the effect that unilateral jurisdiction expansion 
will have on the international legal system itself. Justice 
~ rande i s  once warned that "[ilf the Government becomes a 
93 (3rd ed. 1988). 
99. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 FSupp. 1161, 1178 
(E.D. Pa. 1980). 
100. 679 F.2d 363, 371-72 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1982). 
101. Id. at  371-72. 
102. See Leasco Data Processing Eqyip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 
(2nd Cir. 1972); The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 842 (D. COM. 1925); The Schooner 
Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812). 
103. 46 U.S.C. $ 1903(d) (1988). 
104. RES~ATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES $ 
111(3) (1987). 
105. See, e.g., The Over the Top, 5 F.2d a t  842 ("[U]nless it unmistakably ap- 
pears that a congressional act was intended to be in disregard of a principle of 
international comity, the presumption is that it was intended to be in conformity 
with it") Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 
(1804) ("[Aln Act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of 
nations if any other possible construction remains"). 
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law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to 
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy."lo6 While he 
was speaking specifically about the sovereign breaking domes- 
tic laws, the reasoning is equally apposite to an international 
law context. 
In a system where custom is the generally accepted prac- 
tice, any radical change in that custom is actually formative of 
the new customary law. This is true in every aspect of interna- 
tional jurisprudence. Every nation that violates a principle of 
customary law changes that law somehow. Perhaps the viola- 
tion in question is so egregious that the world community re- 
solves never again to allow such a violation, and the law chang- 
es due to that resolution. More commonly, however, a nation 
violates a principle of the accepted practice, only to see the 
violation duplicated by other nations. Soon more nations ignore 
the "ancient" custom and determine their own policy regarding 
the rapidly disintegrating legal principle. Finally, wholesale 
disregard for the former order quickly replaces the principle 
with either a different custom or "international anarchy" as to 
that principle. 
Particularly malleable is the law of the sea. The changing, 
dynamic nature of the law of the high seas was noted by Pro- 
fessor McDougal, who obsemed that 
the international law of the sea is not a mere static body of 
rules but i s  rather a whole decision-making process . . . of 
continuous interaction, of continuous demand and response, 
in which the decision-makers or particular nation states uni- 
laterally put forward claims of the most diverse and conflict- 
ing character to the use of the world's seas, and in which other 
decision-makers . . . weigh and appraise these competing 
claims in terms of the interests of the world community and 
of the rival claimants, and ultimately accept or reject them. 
As such a process, it is a living, growing law . . . .lo' 
Because the international law is a "living, growing law," 
United States actions, even if technically legal, must be 
couched in policies that emphasize patience and restraint. Un- 
doubtedly, other decision-makers from other nations will either 
106. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent- 
ing). 
107. Myres S. McDougal, Editorial Note, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the 
Znternutional Law of the Sea, 49 AM. J. L. 356, 356-57 (1955) (emphasis 
added). 
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resist or follow the United States lead in this area. Whichever 
action the world community chooses to take, the international 
law of the sea will be unavoidably and forever altered. 
. THE NEED TO ~ D U C E  DEMAND FOR DRUGS WITHIN 
THE UNITED STATES 
The focus of the United States drug war also raises prob- 
lematic issues. Although the purpose of this comment is not to 
present a plan for waging the war, a few thoughts may be 
appropriate as an epilogue. The plague of drugs is truly fright- 
ening. Indeed, we fear losing an entire urban generation to the 
ravaging effects of addiction. Yet despite the crisis and our  
vigorous denouncement of the drugs-for-pleasure trade, we 
clling doggedly to  the cultural hedonism which morally under- 
writes our drug use. Hence, the drug war movement conspicu- 
ously smacks of "buck-passing." A cultue that places a pre- 
mium on "relaxing" and "getting away from it all" should not be 
surprised when the young, innovative minds of that society 
simply find more effective ways to reach the perceived goal. 
The answer, however, will not be found in the siren calls 
for legalization. The legalization of narcotics would lead to 
disastrous results, fueled by the inevitable enormous increase 
in drug use. In turn, this would lead to similar increases in 
drug-related and drug-affected crimes, accidents, and 
untreatable addiction.'" In addition, legalization implicitly 
admits a moral defeat that would breed a general disrespect for 
the law.''' Contrary to the academic view in support of legal- 
ization, narcotics abuse is not a victimless crime. Drug use, 
particularly with the more powerful narcotics such as crack 
and heroin, often leads to dangerous results for the user, the 
user's family, and the c~rnrnunity''~ Much drug-related crime 
is directly tied to  the use of drugs rather than their sale or 
acquisition. Legalization, therefore, only encourages the trage- 
dy* 
108. Bruce Fein & William B. Reynolds, Drug Legalization, One Dopey Idea, 
LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 15, 1990, at 22. 
109. See id.; see also, Gordon Witkin, Cops Under Fire, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPOW, Dec. 3, 1990, at 32. 
110. See, e.g., Fein & Reynolds, supra note 106 (reporting that "a D.C. mother 
had murdered two of her children and attempted strangulation of a third after an 
exhilarating session with crack cocaine"). 
1651 EXPORTING U.S. DRUG POLICY 189 
Elementary economics suggests that a supply of drugs will 
be available so long as there is demand. Therefore, any attempt 
to solve the drug problem must confront demand by enlisting 
both the private and public sectors, by educating existing and 
potential drug users, and by tirelessly enforcing the drug laws 
already on the books. But the plan must also address the con- 
tradiction of a society that welcomes whiskey, yet condemns 
cocaine. To inquisitive children and teenagers, the line between 
'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' mind-altering substances is 
fuzzy, a t  best. Until our society deals with such contradictions, 
drug trf ickers  will continue, with or without the approval of 
the international community, to fill our communities with dan- 
gerous drugs. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Extraterritorial enforcement of United States drug laws is 
not working. Because the United States has been unable to 
stop the influx of illicit narcotics a t  its borders, law enforce- 
ment agencies have extended the battlefield beyond those bor- 
ders. The United States currently uses a variety of interna- 
tional legal justifications to extend U.S. jurisdiction over the 
high seas in order to  prosecute the drug war. The Coast Guard, 
the D.E.A., and other federal entities have become involved in 
this battle that critics argue is unwinnable. 
The problem is not one of manpower, ships, money or pros- 
ecutorial tools, however. The problem is one of moral inconsis- 
tency and economics. As long as the American appetite for 
crack, cocaine, marijuana and heroin remains ravenous, there 
will be a drug war to fight. When demand and hence profits 
from illicit drug production, manufadure and traflicking cease, 
the smuggling will stop. The drug war will have been won. 
Until the drug war is won, unilateral expansion of extra- 
territorial jurisdiction in a drug effort that is unwinnable out- 
side United States borders is foolish, costly and ultimately 
damaging to the international legal system. Even though the 
problem will never be wholly solved in Colombia, Bolivia or 
Peru, international cooperation is still vital to overall success 
and should continue to be sought. Jurisdiction over stateless 
vessels on the high seas would be better expanded through 
international dialogue and diplomacy rather than by Congress. 
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Such an international process would allow all nations to par- 
ticipate in the formation of the "living, growing" international 
law, and would enhance the comity of nations as well as the 
order of the seas. 
D. Brian Boggess 
